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Contemporary critiques of police unions typically highlight the unions’ abilities to 
obstruct accountability and reform processes. This paper examines police unions from an 
alternate perspective, focusing on how they cause harm by expanding the institution of police. 
Through a review of the concepts, history, and contemporary impacts of policing, I interpret the 
police as fundamentally an institution of violent oppression. I use this assessment to reframe the 
harmful impacts of police unions as organizations that expand their institutional power by using 
collective bargaining power to increase police funding. To extend this evaluation, I conduct an 
empirical analysis of the impact of collective bargaining on law enforcement budgets in Florida. 
Using fixed-effects regression analysis, I find that the introduction of collective bargaining rights 
led to a 29.5% increase in sheriffs’ office budgets and a 1.3% increase in the proportion of law 
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Over the summer of 2020, hundreds of Black Lives Matter protests arose in response to 
the torturous public murder of George Floyd by the Minneapolis police over an alleged 
counterfeit $20 bill. Some have labeled this the largest social movement in United States history 
(Buchanan, Bui, and Patel 2020). Building upon decades of sustained community organizing that 
acknowledged the fundamental violence of policing, millions took to the streets behind banners 
that called for defunding and abolishing the police. These demands marked a distinct shift away 
from the popular belief in the necessity of police reformation and thus relegitimization and 
expansion of the institution. 
Despite oft-opposing demands, a common recognition among police abolitionists and 
preservationists alike is that police union power is an obstacle in the pursuit of justice. Typical 
critiques of police unions point to the need for police accountability and reform to reduce police 
violence. These processes are often hindered by the collective bargaining agreements and 
political influence of unions. My thesis eschews the dominant critique of police unions, instead 
providing a scholarly accompaniment to more radical analyses of police unions. Although police 
unions are often called “benevolent associations,” (and while police unions certainly are 
benevolent to police officers themselves) this analysis sees police unions as associations of 
malevolence. Drawing from abolitionist arguments which address police violence by challenging 
policing itself, I explore the extent to which police unions cause harm by strengthening the 
institution of police rather than how they protect “bad apples” from consequences or obstruct 




I begin my examination of police unions with an assessment of policing that is based on a 
conceptual analysis, a review of the historical legacy of policing, and the contemporary impact of 
the institution. Such an examination is crucial for understanding violence against marginalized 
people as the core of policing, rather than an exception. I then review popular critiques of police 
unions and the role of police unions in relation to the labor movement, which inform my framing 
of the problem of police unions as a problem of police. I find that a comprehensive 
understanding of the negative impacts of police unions should reflect the extent to which police 
unions empower police as an institution. Drawing from the demands of the movement to defund 
the police which seek to reduce police violence by diminishing police expenditures, I focus on 
police budgets as a primary indicator of police power. I then empirically assess the impacts of 
collective bargaining rights on law enforcement budgets in Florida. The results are consistent 
with my reconceptualization of police union power. 
 
II. Theoretical Considerations on the Role of Police 
A. Societal Analysis 
As a method of domination itself, policing must be contextualized within the underlying 
systems of dominance upon which the U.S. was built and continues to sustain itself. 
Interconnected oppressions in the form of settler-colonialism, white supremacy, anti-Blackness, 
ableism, cisheteropatriarchy, capitalist exploitation, and imperialist expansion continue to define 
the power dynamics of U.S. society through laws and norms. The carceral state1 acts as a 
 
1 The carceral state encompasses a vast network of disciplinary forces. Naomi Murakawa (2014, 213) provides a 
comprehensive definition of its makeup: “State institutions, policies, and personnel become part of the carceral state 
when and to the extent that they: (1) require exclusion based on a person’s criminal justice stats (e.g., felon 
disenfranchisement and exclusion from higher education loans); (2865) use prison or jail as reprimand for issues 
beyond criminal law (e.g., imprisonment for nonpayment of consumer debt or legal financial obligations); (3) 
integrate criminal justice personnel into regular institutional practices (e.g., police in public schools); and (4) cross-




mechanism of social control to maintain the systems of dominance and withstand resistance 
(Foucault 1995; James 1996; Garland 2001). Police serve as the foot soldiers of the carceral 
state, fabricating the social order through the power of the badge and gun (Neocleous 2021). As 
Williams notes (2015, 48), “police activities, legal or illegal, violent or nonviolent, tend to keep 
the people who currently stand at the bottom of the social hierarchy in their ‘place,’ where they 
‘belong’—at the bottom. This is why James Baldwin said that policing was ‘oppressive’ and ‘an 
insult’.”  
This broad context is necessary to frame an institutional, rather than a narrower analysis 
of police and their violence. Though individual officers vary in their intentions and actions, they 
all operate within the context of structural domination as police. Some characterize the U.S. 
police system as “broken” or “flawed,” but these analyses disregard the fundamental purpose of 
police as a force of oppression. Officers facing significant public scrutiny for violence are often 
characterized as “bad apples” that are unrepresentative of other police. That phrase comes from 
the proverb “one bad apple spoils the whole barrel,” which would imply that one officer’s 
malicious behavior would impact the rest. However, this is also an incomplete understanding of 
police violence. To extend the metaphor, the deepest analyses of police violence, typically from 
police abolitionists, incorporate a systemic perspective which holds that the apple tree, as the 
institution of policing, is rotten to the core and grown from the toxic soil of global inequality. 
Abolitionists recognize that to eliminate police violence, the metaphorical tree must not only be 
felled, but the ground tilled and fertilized. This is what abolitionist scholar Ruth Wilson Gilmore 
means when she says “abolition is deliberately everything-ist; it’s about the entirety of human-





B. Construction of Criminality 
The construction of criminality is crucial to the rationalization and facilitation of carceral 
control. There is a wide range of beliefs about the purpose of the police, but crime control is 
commonly acknowledged as a central component to policing. Despite majority disapproval 
ratings in some other job functions, most Americans believe police are doing a good job 
specifically at protecting people from crime (Pew Research Center 2020). However, crime is not 
an accurate or neutral indicator of harm. As civil rights lawyer Alec Karakatsanis (2019) notes, 
“criminal law is not an inviolate repository of right and wrong, but—just like any other policy 
fashioned in a country as unequal as ours—a tool related to cultural, racial, and economic 
features of our society.” To maintain the stability of those features, what counts as crime depends 
upon who needs to be controlled (Gilmore 2007). Criminality is often defined by individual 
failings that ignore systemic contexts, which allows for the perpetual targeting of the 
systemically disadvantaged. Through the societal imposition of criminality upon marginalized 
groups, police are authorized to use violence against them to maintain order. Therefore, the 
selective definition and punishment of criminality reveals the underlying power dynamics of our 
society. 
Shoplifting, for example, is enforced and penalized far more heavily than minimum wage 
violations by businesses dollar-for-dollar, despite the disparate impacts of the two forms of theft. 
Both shoplifting and minimum wage violations amount to $15 billion per year in value stolen, 
but while the former spoils the ability of corporations to maximize profits, the latter forces 
302,000 families below the federal poverty line (Traub). Retailers spend 39 times more on 
security than the Department of Labor spends on enforcing minimum wage standards and while 




civil penalties are mild (Traub). Minimum wage violations are clearly a much more harmful 
form of theft, but because it is committed by powerful entities against the less powerful, it is less 
heavily criminalized and punished than shoplifting. 
In 2018, 700,000 people were arrested on marijuana charges despite the relatively 
insignificant harm caused by the drug and overwhelming support for legalization (Drug Policy 
Alliance 2017; Lopez 2017; ACLU 2020). Reflecting the history of the racist war on drugs in the 
U.S., Black people were arrested for marijuana at a rate 3.64 times higher than the rate of white 
people in 2018 (ACLU 2020). Meanwhile, powerful pharmaceutical companies use the criminal 
legal system as a tool to protect their profits by pushing for the continued criminalization of 
marijuana, which encourages opioid dependence (and overdose) as an alternative (Serrano 2016).  
The crime of jaywalking is a construction of car manufacturers who sought to avoid 
tighter transportation safety regulations by socially and legally redefining public space following 
the rapid rise in pedestrian deaths caused by the introduction of cars (Stromberg 2015). Today, 
jaywalking represents one of countless traffic laws that disproportionately target marginalized 
people with citations and fines and are used to establish probable cause for detaining and 
searching “suspicious” people who could not otherwise be legally stopped (Sanders, Rabinowitz, 
and Conarck 2017).  
Even the social and legal designation of criminality for physical violence is dependent 
upon the status of the perpetrator and victim. The federal government reserves its harshest 
punishment, the death penalty, almost exclusively for various types of murder offenses (Snell 
2020). By responding to violence with violence, the state demonstrates which forms of violence 
are deemed acceptable and which are deemed criminal. Despite only constituting 13% of the 




more likely to be sentenced to death for killing a white person than for killing a Black person 
(Equal Justice Initiative). Whereas physical violence committed by Black people is considered 
criminal, state violence toward Black people is praxis. 
These examples show how particular activities are labeled as criminal, but they represent 
only a portion of the vast network of criminal construction—a web of behavioral and physical 
designations which determines who is labeled, stigmatized, surveilled, and punished as 
“criminal,” “deviant,” or otherwise “unworthy,” legitimating police (among other forms of 
social) control over entire groups of people. For instance, following the end of the 
Reconstruction era, African Americans were disproportionately imprisoned as a result of 
“specifically designed race-conscious laws, discriminatory punishments, and new forms of 
everyday racial surveillance [that] had been institutionalized by the 1890s as a way to suppress 
black freedom” (Muhammad 2010, 4). To justify the postbellum continuation of the white 
supremacist racial hierarchy that was frequently enforced by police violence, racial liberals 
blamed this “criminality” on Black culture, thus criminalizing Blackness itself (Muhammad 
2010). As Joy James (1996, 26-27) notes, “where the plague and the leper are codified in the 
black, for instance, the dreams and desires of a society and state will be centered on the control 
of the black body.” John Ehrlichman, who served as Nixon’s domestic policy advisor provided 
an unmistakable confirmation of this enduring process in an interview:  
The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two enemies: 
the antiwar left and black people. You understand what I’m saying? We knew we 
couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the public to 
associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both 
heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could arrest their leaders, raid their 
homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them night after night on the evening news. 





Though the antiblack punitive tradition is perhaps the clearest example of law 
enforcement’s role in the suppression of entire deviant-deemed groups, it “exemplifies the 
perpetual criminalization of a constellation of marginalized, minority-identified populations” 
(Hinton and Cook 2021, 262; emphasis my own). For instance, bans on traditional dancing, 
drumming, and Native languages and heavy enforcement of alcohol abuse-related violations2 
have contributed to the criminalization of indigeneity (Kilgore 2016). The “walking while trans” 
anti-loitering law, which was recently repealed in New York, is one of many laws criminalizing 
deviant gender and sexuality (Mogul, Ritchie, and Whitlock 2011; Yurcaba 2021). The targeting 
of most marginalized identities intersects with the criminalization of poverty, which treats the 
inability to afford basic necessities (due to resource hoarding and exclusion under racial 
capitalism) and the resultant struggle to survive as an offense against society worthy of 
punishment. 
 
C. Policing as Violence 
 The police’s power to exert social control is based in violence. For this reason, historian 
Micol Siegel (2018) succinctly characterizes the job of the police as “violence work.” Police 
demonstrate control through body language and their presence alone is enough to induce anxiety 
and trauma symptoms, which contribute to negative long-term health outcomes (Geller et al. 
2014; Sewell and Jefferson 2016). While most encounters with the police are not deadly, they all 
 
2 Though alcohol dependence is generally seen as partly heritable, predisposition to alcoholism has not been proven 
to be a natural trait of indigeneity itself. However, alcohol abuse and alcohol-related deaths are a particular problem 
on reservations due to young and poor demographics, historically “flamboyant” drinking styles, and high-risk 
environments, as well as the historical legacy of alcohol as a “colonial weapon” introduced by settlers to control and 




occur with the potential for an officer to use handcuffs or weapons to force compliance. As 
Harring (2017, 255) notes,  
The capacity of the police to intervene in family problems, settle informal disputes on the 
street, and direct those in need of help to proper institutions all turns on the capacity for 
violence. The police officer’s recommendation that an alcoholic report to a shelter for 
treatment and lodging is not just another friendly suggestion: the officer has the option of 
arrest the next time he sees the person. 
 
  The power to use violence is administered disproportionately according to class, race, 
ability, gender, and sexuality, a result of both the fundamental purpose of the job as well as 
officers’ individual biases. The police’s fast violence, seen in the flashes of their handcuffs and 
gun muzzles, complements a legacy of top-down slow violence, distilling centuries of state-
sanctioned dehumanization and destruction of marginalized people into the ratcheting of 
shackles and the clicking of triggers (Colebrook 2020). Violence is therefore not a byproduct of 
policing, but rather fundamental to the institution, due to its legal authorization, interconnected 
forms (as physical, sexual, psychological, and exploitative economic violence), routine 
occurrence, and targeting along vectors of marginalization that reflect and reproduce the patterns 
of society (Akbar 2020).  
 
III. The History of Policing 
A. Police Origins 
 A historical analysis of police is necessary to understand contemporary police violence in 
the context of systemic patterns of domination. Without the historical context, police may seem 
like a natural, everlasting presence in society, rather than a human invention that has been 
continuously adapted to control particular marginalized groups since its inception. By examining 




violence and discrimination actually are reflective of the core nature of the job. In this section, I 
explore the origins of modern policing in London as a means to quash labor uprisings—a model 
that was then exported to the northern U. S., where workers in industrializing cities were 
contesting capitalist power. I then describe the origins of police departments in the southern U.S. 
as a tool to control Black people, first as an extension of slave patrols, then to facilitate convict 
leasing.  
The London Metropolitan Police, established in 1829 by Robert Peel, is known as the 
first (modern) professional police force (Vitale 2018; Go 2020). The need for this force arose out 
of the inability of local militias and the British Army to quell uprisings caused by pervasive 
poverty and changes in the workforce from industrialization (Vitale 2018). Following the 
Peterloo Massacre of 1819 in Manchester, a deadly military response to a peaceful rally 
expressing political and economic discontent, the British state began to use vagrancy laws to 
control wage-laboring populations by forcing them into productive work (Vitale 2018). Peel set 
out to create a police force to maintain the political and economic stability of the turbulent 
capitalist order by cracking down on vagrants, rioters, and strikers and by protecting property 
(Vitale 2018). 
The emergence of police departments in the U.S. differed in the North and South of the 
country, as each version intended to control the specific populations of interest in the region. In 
the North, the capitalist class adapted and expanded the London model of policing to manage 
wage-laboring populations in industrializing cities. Though private armed forces, such as the 
Pinkertons, did exist, they “lacked the manpower, the legitimacy, and the will” that the police, as 
a bureaucratic arm of the state, could develop (Mitrani 2013, 12). The militia and national guard 




disciplined,” which created an opening for local police to take on the role of controlling the 
working-class (Harring 2017, 147). 
Sidney Harring (2017) explores how Buffalo, Milwaukee, Chicago, Pittsburgh, 
Cleveland, Detroit, and several smaller cities saw the expansion and professionalization of police 
as a response to class struggle between the end of the Civil War and 1915s. As workers began to 
move from the countryside to cities and urban economies shifted toward manufacturing, 
powerful businessmen began to invest in policing to protect their property interests. For instance, 
following the founding of the Buffalo police department in 1871, mayors and mayor-appointed 
police commissioners—both roles comprised overwhelmingly of businessmen themselves—were 
heavily involved in the overarching structure and everyday operations of the police (Harring and 
McMullin 1975). Between 1870 and 1900, the years of the study, the expansion of the 
department did not correlate with population or crime increases, but instead with the “labor 
problem” in the city, which came in the form of strikes and demonstrations against low wages 
and unfair working conditions. In Chicago, as the economy shifted away from petty proprietors, 
wealthy merchants, and land speculators to large-scale industrial wage labor controlled by a 
small number of elites, businessmen were instrumental in shaping police policy and expansion, 
even donating money for weapons, buildings and police pensions (Mitrani 2013).  
Throughout the North, police were used as a tool to manage class struggle. Their most 
explicit embodiment of this role was as strike-breakers. Police were routinely deployed for the 
entire duration of a strike—which could last up to several weeks—to handle class conflict by 
surveilling, beating, and even killing strikers and strike supporters and protecting corporate 
property and scabs (Harring 2017). Other functions of the police as an institution of class control 




gambling, prostitution, and tramping (the practice of traveling in search of work) (Harring 2017). 
As Harring (2017) notes, though police also began to take on the role of crime-control, this 
practice can be seen as an extension of the control over working class activity. 
Local, centralized, bureaucratic police departments in the South emerged out of slave 
patrols, an institution intended to monitor and brutalize the Black population and prevent revolts 
(Vitale 2018). In a foreshadowing of modern “stop and frisk” policies, these patrols routinely 
inspected the papers of both enslaved and free Black people as part of the strategy to stop Black 
people from building community and power. Slave patrols were also tasked with hunting down 
and returning enslaved people that were trying to flee to the North (Vitale 2018). 
After the adoption of the 13th amendment in 1865, the core functions of slave patrols 
were carried out by the nascent institutions of the police and the Ku Klux Klan. Though they 
bore different names and levels of institutional legitimacy, the police at the KKK perpetrated 
explicitly and implicitly state-sanctioned violence toward Black people to the extent that 
formerly enslaved people “recognized that precious little difference existed between the brutality 
of slave patrols, white Southern policemen, or the Klan” (Hadden 2001, 220).   
Law enforcement later evolved to support the vast project of convict leasing. At the 
behest of corporate labor agents looking for cheap workers, sheriffs, who were paid in court fees, 
were “financially motivated to arrest and convict as many people as possible” (Blackmon 2008, 
65). Between 100,000 and 200,000 Black people, previously freed from slavery, were arrested by 
sheriffs and forced into labor for violating laws that were written specifically to control Black 
people, such as changing employers without permission, vagrancy, riding freight cars without a 





B. The Modern Expansion of the Carceral State 
Whereas in the previous section, I aimed to highlight the original intentions of policing as 
part of my institutional analysis, this section on more recent police history demonstrates how the 
underlying role of the police as a tool to control marginalized populations has only grown to this 
day due to drastic deliberate investments in punishment. Though I have separated these two 
eras—the origins and modern expansion of policing—into different sections, they are not that 
distinct; convict leasing was only formally abolished in 1941, a mere generation before the vast 
expansion of the U.S. police and prison apparatus (Blackmon 2008). These evolving applications 
of the same logics of anti-Black carceral control in the U.S. are what have led scholars to label 
today’s practices of policing and incarceration as “The New Jim Crow” and “Neoslavery” 
(Alexander 2012; Childs 2015).  
The expansion of the carceral state during the second half of the 20th century provides the 
most explicit example of policing as a facet of what Ruth Wilson Gilmore calls “organized 
violence,” created and maintained by the state to deal with “organized abandonment” (Gilmore 
and Gilmore 2016). Following a series of social and economic crises, powerful actors heeded 
“racial capitalism’s contemporary self-saving modality” by “starving the welfare state and 
smashing regulatory and other barriers to rapid accumulation” (Gilmore and Gilmore 2016, 190). 
The state could have responded to problems of injustice through investment in care and 
empowerment. Instead, the state adopted coercive measures in the form of enhanced criminal 
justice, a process that was aided by cultural shifts and anti-crime and anti-Black rhetoric.  
Vesla Weaver (2007) describes the punitive crime policy development process in the 
1960s and 1970s as an example of “frontlash,” in which the losers of the civil rights era 




state as a tool to advance their original anti-civil rights agenda. As Republican presidential 
candidate Barry Goldwater and Southern Democrats began to galvanize the public about “law 
and order,” invoking inflammatory images of civil rights demonstrations and the supposedly 
ensuing violent crime, President Johnson was pressured into adopting a law-and-order agenda 
and began pushing Congress to enact anti-crime legislation. The increased reliance on 
punishment that resulted from this era laid the groundwork for future investment in policing and 
prisons as a way to manage social and economic crises. 
In a detailed historical account, Christian Parenti (1999) describes how capitalist crises 
beginning in the 1960s resulted in the vast expansion of policing. The post-war economic boom 
in the U.S. created an environment of high taxes and rising wages with little competition on the 
international scale. In 1946, the U.S. produced half of world output and maintained global export 
dominance for the next several years (Parenti 1999). However, this dramatic business boom 
could not last. A combination of increased competition from Germany and Japan, the 
overaccumulation of consumer durables domestically, stronger labor power and higher wages 
from tight labor markets, rising oil costs, and increased taxes and regulations protecting workers 
and consumers all contributed to plunging profits by the mid-1970s (Parenti 1999; Garland 
2001).  
Reaganomics provided the solution for business interests. In 1979, Reagan’s Federal 
Reserve Chair boosted interest rates, sending the economy into the deepest recession since the 
Great Depression, with the explicit intention of reducing nominal wages (Parenti 1999). In the 
face of rising unemployment and falling wages, the Reagan administration began attacking 
unions and slashing welfare programs, both of which had expanded worker bargaining power, 




deindustrialization as American manufacturers moved to countries with lower wages and 
regulations. The restructured labor market resulted in a shift toward an employment pattern 
characterized by low-paid, part-time, often female workers, or else highly skilled graduate 
employees, leaving many who were already disadvantaged in the labor market (e.g., workers that 
were on average young, low-skilled, poorly educated, and non-white) with even fewer job 
opportunities (Garland 2001).  
The U.S. was also evolving geographically, with white people migrating to the suburbs 
and Black people migrating from the South into redlined neighborhoods in the North (Parenti 
1999; Garland 2001). These processes exacerbated economic and social segregation. A number 
of American social developments, such as changes in the family and household structure, the rise 
of electronic mass media, and widespread adoption of moral individualism—a shift that 
prioritized individual freedoms over group obligations—also contributed to further societal 
divisions that were then used to rationalize the expansion of policing. According to Garland 
(2001, 102), “crime—together with associated ‘underclass’ behaviors such as drugs [sic] abuse, 
teenage pregnancy, single parenthood, and welfare dependency—came to function as a rhetorical 
legitimation for social and economic policies that effectively punished the poor and as a 
justification for the development of strong disciplinary state.” These social developments paired 
with economic changes as “the post-liberal, post-welfare economic equation created more 
poverty and more opulence. Thus, reproducing and governing the social order has required more 
repression, more segregation, and more criminal justice” (Parenti 1999, 45). 
Though the expansion of the carceral state in the late 20th century is often attributed to 
conservative responses to crime, Murakawa (2014, 13) shows how liberal Democrats contributed 




notions of black criminality, [fueling] carceral state-building, and [fortifying] the legitimacy of 
the carceral state.” Liberals, Murakawa (2014, 13) argues, treated racism as a psychological 
defect, which was “a pollutant to the real self” for white people, but “an injury…constitutive of 
the real self” for Black people, and the cause of criminality. At the same time, liberals invested in 
supposedly neutral state-building by professionalizing police and modernizing sentencing, which 
would strengthen punitive and weaken oppositional interest groups and raise the future costs of 
switching to life-affirming systems of education, health care, and employment (Murakawa 2014; 
Weaver and Geller 2019). In doing so, liberals treated racial violence as an administrative 
deficiency (rather than constitutive) of the criminal justice system, “a ghost in the machine, some 
immaterial force detached from the institutional terrain of racialized wealth inequality and the 
possessive investment in whiteness” (Murakawa 2014, 18). By failing to develop a response to 
this analysis of structural oppression and the carceral state, liberals paved the way for the 
bipartisan carceral reform and therefore expansion of a system built on the oppression of poor 
and non-white people. 
A series of escalating measures of race and class-based control in the face of economic 
and social crises led to the era of hyper policing and mass incarceration. For instance, to support 
the “War on Crime,” the Johnson administration passed the Safe Streets Act of 1968. This 
legislation created the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), an agency that 
funded 80,000 crime control projects and awarded $15 billion in grants in today’s dollars toward 
police operations during its fifteen-year lifespan (Hinton 2016). Over the decades that followed, 
states and the federal government built upon crime control legislation like the Safe Streets Act to 
pass a litany of punitive measures that dramatically expanded the capacity of the carceral state. 




hundreds of thousands of police officers have been hired to patrol what Soss and Weaver (2017) 
call “race-class subjugated” communities using increasingly militarized tactics and equipment 
(Hinton 2016).  
 
IV. The Contemporary Practice of Policing 
Contemporary policing practices represent a continuation and expansion of the police’s 
fundamental role of control and oppression. In this section, I seek to strengthen my analysis of 
policing by laying out some of the impacts of contemporary police practices and placing them in 
a broader context to show how they maintain and reproduce inequality. As highlighted in section 
II., it is the very capacity for violence and coercion that defines policing. Therefore, though 
individual acts of police violence currently capture widespread attention, they must be 
understood as representative of the violent nature of policing (Zimring 2017). I highlight the 
impacts of arrests, killings, and asset seizures to demonstrate the cumulative effect of the core 
component of police officers’ jobs—the ability to control marginalized groups of people who 
have been deemed “criminal,” “deviant,” or “unworthy.” Then I describe the impacts of policing 
on the everyday lives of targeted youths in Oakland and Chicago to underline the analysis of 
standard contemporary police practices as overwhelmingly oppressive.  
 
A. Killings 
The deaths of Michael Brown, Breonna Taylor, and George Floyd at the hands of police 
captured headlines but they are not isolated incidents. On average, police kill three civilians per 
day in the U.S. (Zimring 2017). One third of people killed by strangers in the U.S. are killed by 




likely to be killed by police as white people (Washington Post 2021; Hansen 2017). People in the 
highest poverty neighborhoods are 3.5 times as likely to be shot and killed as those in the lowest 
poverty neighborhoods (Feldman 2020). A third to a half of all people killed by police are 
estimated to be disabled, which includes those with mental illnesses (Perry and Carter-Long 
2016). The overwhelming majority of people killed by police are shot, though many are killed by 
Taser or in police custody (Zimring 2017). In many of these instances, police rationalize their 
brutality by pointing to “excited delirium” exhibited by their victim, a pseudoscientific label 
which justifies “fast and overwhelming” force to restrain people reacting to the violence of a 
police encounter (O’Hare, Budhu and Saadi 2020). Focusing solely on killings, however, 
obscures other forms of routine violence police commit against marginalized communities as a 
fulfillment of their job duties.  
 
B. Detention 
 In the U.S., police arrest someone every three seconds (O'Toole and Neusteter 2019). 
Though most arrests are not deadly, they all can result in what is referred to as social and civil 
death, a state of such severe exclusion from humanity-affirming social and political relations that 
it is compared to biological death (Ewald 2002; Price 2015). Per year in the U.S., there are 10.7 
million jail admissions (Zeng 2018). Black people are jailed at over three times and Native 
people jailed at over twice the rate of white people (Zeng 2018). At any given time, almost half a 
million people are held while awaiting trial and still legally innocent, and pre-trial detention can 
last up to several years (Sawyer and Wagner 2020). Many are held not because they are 




the median bail bond amount was equivalent to eight months of income for the average detained 
defendant (Rabuy and Kopf 2016).   
With a court system that heavily disincentivizes trials, 97% of criminal cases result in 
plea deals, even though many defendants are innocent (National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers 2018). Due to this structure, the police effectively act as judge, jury, and 
executioner by funneling people who are disproportionately poor, Black, and Native into 
punishment without a determination of state-defined “guilt.” For those who do not end up in 
prison, citations and arrests trap millions in “misdemeanorland,” a state of control in which 
people are heavily burdened by the procedural hassle of the legal bureaucracy, the economic and 
social consequences of a criminal justice record, and the expectation of civilized performance to 
appease the court (Natapoff 2015; Kohler-Hausmann 2018).  
The most drastic consequence of arrest by police is long-term confinement. Prisons serve 
as the inhumane dumping grounds for relative surplus populations from which industry can 
exploit their captivity to extract value, not just as laborers, but as consumers of overpriced goods 
and services, such as toiletries, phone calls, and around-the-clock lighting (Gilmore 2007). Since 
the early 2000s, the population of incarcerated people in the U.S. has not dipped below two 
million (Kaeble and Cowhig 2018). Prisons are not mechanisms for rehabilitation or 
incapacitation, but rather isolationist chambers of perpetual violence. They do not allow for 
people to adequately address harm they may have caused, disempowering communities to 
collectively solve problems in context and support survivors (Sered 2019). Instead, prisons 
swallow up eons of cumulative life years3 of society’s most abandoned populations through 
 
3 Ernest Drucker employs an epidemiological tool, Years of Life Lost (YLL), to quantify the years of life people lost 
by being in prison. He found, for example, that between 1973 and 2008, 368,000 years of life were lost to 




confinement in wretched conditions of squalor and abuse. Prisons are necessary for maintaining 
the legitimacy of police because they allow for police to displace social problems instead of 
solving them (Gilmore 2007). Alternatives to imprisonment, such as ankle monitors, house 
arrest, and extended probation employ comparable tactics of coercion and societal exclusion, 
giving them the label “prison by any other name” (Schenwar and Law 2020). Following 
incarceration, collateral consequences restrict access to employment, voting, public benefits, 
education, and other forms of participation in normal life (Mauer and Chesney-Lind 2002). 
 
C. Asset Seizure 
 In addition to fines, police frequently extract wealth from the most marginalized people 
through civil asset forfeiture laws. These laws allow law enforcement to take ownership over any 
property they suspect of being involved in a crime, including cash, cars, and homes. Personal 
benefit and loose legal requirements incentivize officers to apply their seizure rights liberally. In 
Philadelphia, for instance, entire homes are “routinely seized for unproved minor drug crimes, 
often involving children or grandchildren who don’t own the home,” overwhelmingly impacting 
Black and Hispanic families (Stillman 2013).  
Because cash is seen as the “lifeblood” of criminal activity and is easy for police to 
transport and spend, it is the most common type of asset forfeiture. In 2018 alone, 42 states, 
D.C., and the federal government seized $3 billion in assets, two thirds of which were cash 
(Knepper et al. 2020). Most of this money came from small-scale forfeitures, with an average 
value of $1,276 across the 21 states with available data (Knepper et al. 2020). Police frequently 
assume that the mere presence of cash on a person is an indication of criminal activity, leading 




Rich 2014). In effect, asset forfeiture practices criminalize carrying cash which 
disproportionately impacts “unbanked” and “underbanked” populations such as low-income, 
Black, Hispanic, and disabled people (Knepper et al. 2020). Victims usually have limited legal 
recourse because hiring a lawyer is often more expensive than the amount of money lost, and 
police face a low legal standard for proving their right to the assets. 
 
D. Pervasive Presence 
The core police functions of state-sanctioned physical violence, detention, and asset 
seizure facilitate the police’s violent and central role in the lives of marginalized people, trapping 
individuals in patterns of punishment and communities in a state of everyday domestic warfare. 
In his ethnography “Punished,” Victor Rios (2011, xv; 21) shadowed and interviewed 40 Black 
and Latino teenagers for three years in Oakland to describe how criminalization was a “central, 
pervasive, and ubiquitous phenomenon,” which, at the hands of the police (and other authorities), 
maintained “an ironclad grip on [the] everyday lives” of the young people he studied. 
Constant police surveillance and abuse inflict shame and stigmatization on marginalized 
people from an early age. Rios (2011) describes how, mirroring the experience of many others, 
one of his interlocutors was handcuffed for the first time at eight years old and beaten at twelve, 
which led to being branded as “criminal,” “at-risk,” and “delinquent,” by peers, police, and other 
authority figures within what Rios calls the “youth control complex.” This labeling helps fuel 
cycles of punishment in which people’s lives are dictated by the conditions of probation, 
incarceration, and other forms of hyper-surveillance over minor violations that compound over 
time. As Rios (2011, 45) notes, “when a young person is on probation, he is left with few rights; 




transgressions such as hanging out with his friends or walking in the wrong part of the 
neighborhood.” Police can add those they deem troublemakers to gang databases “just in case” 
(not because of actual gang affiliation), which can increase potential prison sentences by decades 
(Rios 2011, 62). One boy describes daily life under authoritative surveillance as “having a 
zookeeper watching us at all times” (Rios 2011, 82).  
To avoid constant suspicion and perpetual punishment, some targeted youths attempt to 
“act lawful” by changing their behavior to assimilate into dominant cultures and submitting to 
authority, even when they felt their rights were being violated. Not only did this strategy require 
compromising their autonomy and individuality, but the young people “acting lawfully” were 
still criminalized by authority and resented by peers for participating in the system that oppressed 
them (Rios 2011, 146-147). Ultimately, constant police overreach led many to lose faith in and 
resist the system, expressed through acts of deviance and cultures of resilience. 
 The relentless targeting of marginalized people from an early age is not unique to 
Oakland; it is but one component of the vast project of contemporary policing. In a report to the 
United Nations Committee Against Torture, the Chicago-based grassroots organization We 
Charge Genocide (2014, 4) (WCG) describes the “cruel and degrading treatment of Chicago’s 
youth of color [which] serves to silence, traumatize, and control entire communities.” Drawing 
from archival and testimonial analysis, the group reports that police violence “creates a climate 
where youth of color feel unsafe and learn that they always are suspects and that their lives are 
not valued in the eyes of the state” (We Charge Genocide 2014, 4). Ethnic studies scholar Dylan 
Rodriguez (2021, 148) highlights the importance of the WCG report for “addressing a climate of 
comprehensive, systemic vulnerability to everyday, normally functioning, non-scandalous racist 




the exception in policing, the report challenges the notion that “policing is somehow separable 
from its systemic practices,” and can therefore be reformed or corrected. 
 
V. The Role of Police Unions 
The institutional assessment of police in the previous sections informs the following 
examination of police unions. As a consolidation of police power, police unions have drawn 
considerable criticism for exacerbating contemporary police issues. As unions, police unions 
increase the bargaining power of their members, which gives an already powerful job even more 
economic and political sway. Many criticisms recognize this but interpret the power of police 
unions with a focus on the individual violence of police. My assessment of police unions 
accounts for the institutional violence of police, which allows for a broader understanding of 
how police unions contribute to the harms of policing.  
In this section, I review typical critiques of police unions which focus on reform, 
accountability, and incidents of misconduct. Because these understandings largely leave the 
institutional violence of police unaddressed, they often target collective bargaining procedures as 
the main issue of police unions, thereby potentially strengthening arguments against other unions 
and overlooking the broader impacts of increased police power. I address these limitations by 
reconceptualizing the harm of police unions as a contributor to the expansion of policing. This 
assessment informs (and is enhanced by) my empirical analysis, in which I evaluate the impacts 
of collective bargaining rights on law enforcement budgets in Florida. 
 




 Police officers belong to a range of organizations that exercise collective membership 
power to represent their interests. I use the term “union” to refer to such organizations, though 
some are called benevolent associations, local federations and lodges, and protective leagues and 
have slight differences with actual police unions in their functions and membership (Fisk and 
Song 2017). The primary function of police unions is to engage in collective bargaining with 
local government to advocate for the interests of members, typically in regard to wages, benefits, 
hours, and other working conditions such as hiring, promotion, and disciplinary procedures 
(Rushin 2017). Police unions also represent the interests of their members through advocacy in 
electoral politics, litigation, and media (Fisk and Song 2017). For instance, police unions endorse 
political candidates that they believe will enact favorable policies, challenge local governments 
in court over infringements on their collective bargaining agreements, and speak out against 
police budget cuts in the news. 
 Police unions first emerged during the early 20th century due to poor working conditions 
but were not very common and often condemned, as police strikes were associated with a risk to 
public safety. As policing drew more public scrutiny during the Civil Rights Movement, police 
reacted by forming and expanding unions to fortify the institution (Walker 2008). Now, police 
are among the most densely unionized employees in the U.S. Roughly 66 percent of police 
officers have collective bargaining rights (Reaves 2011), compared to a unionization rate of 35 
percent for all public-sector workers (which includes police) and only 6 percent for private-
sector workers (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2021). High membership rates, paired with the 
underlying power in the role of police, have made police unions a particularly strong force in 





B. Common Critiques 
 In the aftermath of police killings, media narratives repeatedly point to police unions as a 
primary obstacle to reform and accountability (New York Times Editorial Board 2016; Chabria 
2020; Greenhouse 2020). Thanks to favorable contracts negotiated by police unions that 
determine the conditions of employment, police officers are well protected from substantial 
consequences for misconduct. A study of 178 union contracts across the U.S. found that a 
“substantial number of these agreements limit officer interrogations after alleged misconduct, 
mandate the destruction of disciplinary records, ban civilian oversight, prevent anonymous 
civilian complaints, indemnify officers in the event of civil suits, and limit the length of internal 
investigations” (Rushin 2017, 1192).  A Reuters investigation of 82 police union contracts in 
large U.S. cities revealed similar results (Levinson 2017). The Chicago Police Accountability 
Task Force (2016) found that “the collective bargaining agreements between the police unions 
and the City have essentially turned the code of silence into official policy.” Given the hurdles 
these contracts create toward accountability, police unions are seen by some as “key to 
understanding why officers across the country escape discipline time and again after beating or 
killing people” (Michaels 2020).  
Scholars and popular media identify police unions as significant obstacles to some police 
reforms that would go beyond individual accountability efforts [McCormick 2015; Fisk and 
Song 2017; Scheiber, Stockman, and Goodman 2021). A review of 17 federal consent decrees, 
which are a tool of the Department of Justice to compel cities to reform police departments due 
to a documentation of civil rights abuses, found that “police unions watered down measures that 
contradicted their contracts, or they launched legal challenges that, even when unsuccessful, 




George Floyd’s death, Minneapolis Mayor Jacob Frey described police union contracts as a 
“nearly impenetrable barrier” to reform (The Daily 2020). Police unions have also drawn 
scrutiny as a powerful force in lobbying against police reform efforts. Between New York City, 
Los Angeles, and Chicago, police unions have spent $87 million on influencing law enforcement 
policy and preventing reform efforts over the past two decades and another $47 million at the 
federal level in recent election cycles (Perkins 2020). 
The relationship between police unions and instances of police violence is a less popular 
topic in the media and among politicians than the previous critiques of police unions but has 
become a subject of academic interest in recent years. One study found that the introduction of 
collective bargaining rights led to a 40% increase in violent incidents of misconduct among 
Florida sheriffs’ offices (Dharmapala, McAdams, and Rappaport 2019). Another study found 
that collective bargaining rights increased police killings of disproportionately non-white 
civilians and did not result in higher officer safety [a common justification for the stronger job 
protections offered by police union contracts] (Cunningham, Feir, and Gillezeau 2021).  
 
C. Limitations of Common Critiques 
While helpful in identifying specific roadblocks to diminishing police power, the 
previous critiques are often framed as a problem of unions rather than a problem of police. This 
framing sees police unions as exceptional among other unions, and therefore in need of reform. 
Indeed, other unions do not shield members from consequences for killing someone, for instance. 
However, police unions are different not because of their peculiarity as unions, but rather the 
distinctiveness of their members. In this section, I explore both the limitations of 





1. Problematic Critique of Unions 
Many police union critiques risk bolstering anti-labor arguments by treating the harmful 
consequences of police union power mainly as an issue of unions. These assessments suggest 
restricting the collective bargaining of police unions due to an excess of otherwise legitimate 
police power. Rushin (2017) has proposed incorporating public and interest group input into the 
collective bargaining process. Others have suggested limiting police union negotiations to wages 
and hours, leaving out disciplinary procedures (Boston Globe Editorial Board 2020). By focusing 
on police unions mainly as an issue of exaggerated union power, there is a risk of anti-union 
rhetoric and tools transferring to unions in other sectors (Jamieson 2020). As legal scholar 
Benjamin Levin (2020, 1359) lays out, critiques of police unions as obstructors of reform and 
accountability efforts are often difficult to distinguish from critiques of labor unions at large: 
“the ‘obstruction’ at the heart of the critiques is central to the function of unions. That is, the duty 
of fair representation speaks the language of obstruction—it is the union’s job to represent and 
protect the rights of its members.”  
Police unions obstruct accountability and reforms through contract language that provides 
strong workplace protections as well as by advancing broader political goals that are aligned with 
the members’ interests, fundamental characteristics of any union. Most labor unions do not have 
special measures in place to protect workers from discipline after they have killed someone as a 
result of their work. However, state-authorized violence is central to the job of a police officer. 
Therefore, the regulation of violence can be collectively bargained for as a work condition. This 
includes, for instance, lenient arbitration policies that encourage appeals processes and allow 




questioned. Though these policies make it significantly harder for officers to face consequences 
for misconduct, that is precisely the point of workplace protections; they give officers more 
freedom in their work while maintaining job security. 
When critically addressing the bargaining power of police unions, some focus on 
curtailing certain collective bargaining practices, a stance that risks diminishing broader worker 
power. Others have been hesitant to critique police unions at all for fear of weakening the entire 
labor movement (McQuarrie 2020). Both approaches are limited because they either fail to 
address the issues of police unions entirely, or they risk weakening the labor movement and 
overlook the underlying issues of the police. 
 
2. Narrow Analysis of Police Violence 
Police unions often draw condemnation for increasing the violence of individual police 
officers, but critiques of police unions that are not centered in critiques of police miss how police 
unions only exacerbate the fundamental violence of policing. Particularly obstructive police 
unions are often painted as rogue or out of step with the true values of police departments. 
However, given the previous analysis of police as an institution of violence, police unions that 
hamper certain accountability and reform efforts can be understood as rational extensions of 
policing, as far as they facilitate the violence of police officers. As a measure of collective police 
power, police unions serve as a direct indictment of the structural violence of policing. 
Public opinion of police unions has not reckoned with this understanding. In a poll 
conducted during the Black Lives Matter protests in the summer of 2020, 56% of Americans 
supported eliminating police unions, but only 15% supported abolishing police departments 




organizing and bargaining rights simply becomes a second-order mechanism for regulating the 
first-order problem (i.e., violence)” that stands at the center of policing (Levin 2020, 1372). 
Therefore, efforts to address police union power that do not recognize police as a fundamentally 
violent institution may attempt to “fix,” (and therefore relegitimize and expand) policing rather 
than reduce it. For instance, some have proposed implementing “rank-and-file” or “minority 
unionism” structures within police unions to increase workplace democracy (Sklansky 2007; 
Fisk and Richardson 2017). While these reforms may reduce obstacles to individual 
accountability, they ultimately enhance police union power, which strengthens the institution, 
and therefore violence, of the police.  
Even proposals that do reduce police union power but do not recognize the underlying 
violence of the job focus on the “exceptional,” rather than everyday violence of policing. When 
such police union reforms are implemented, proponents may claim victory, but the underlying 
structure of policing remains intact. For example, some find the deletion of disciplinary records 
to be a key problem with police union power. However, police are usually not disciplined for 
doing their job. Therefore, disciplinary records will not show the everyday harm that police are 
hired, trained, and paid to do, whether the records are routinely destroyed as a condition of a 
collective bargaining agreement or not. Improving opaque misconduct investigation procedures, 
which police unions have fought to protect, would potentially increase consequences for 
individual officers that kill unarmed civilians and carry out other acts of violence deemed 
egregious by the general public. However, such a narrow focus fails to address the routine 
surveillance, harassment, arrest, and killing of marginalized people that is not labeled 




Critiques that focus specifically on increased incidents of violence due to unionization get 
closer to addressing the violence of policing, but typically do not utilize a framework that 
recognizes the fundamental violence of the institution. For instance, Cunningham, Feir, and 
Gillezeau (2021) determined that collective bargaining led to the increased killing of non-white 
civilians. They hypothesized that collective bargaining rights may “shift the marginal decision to 
shoot in a difficult situation” by providing more officer protections (Cunningham, Feir, and 
Gillezeau 2021, 30). Cunningham, Feir, and Gillezeau (2021) suggest this could lead to an 
increased discriminatory use of force by officers who may already have been more likely to use 
violence against Black and Indigenous people. While this may be true, this framing still focuses 
on how unionization compounds the individual, rather than institutional, violence of police. 
Police union power is rightfully deemed an obstacle to reducing police violence, but a 
comprehensive understanding of police violence is necessary to meaningfully reduce police 
union power. 
 
D. Reframing Police Union Harm 
A more thorough analysis of the harm of police unions recognizes the fundamental 
violence of police while avoiding arguments that could potentially weaken the labor movement. 
This assessment begins with the assumption that police unions are objectionable, not because of 
their collective bargaining power per se, but because they represent a consolidation of the 
“otherwise- or already-illegitimate power” of police (Levin 2020, 1388). This analysis does not 
jeopardize the labor movement at large because it targets underlying issues of police, which 




Some in the labor movement have already employed this analysis to varying degrees, 
noting the contradiction of police and the goals of unionization (Gude 2014). In August 2020, 
Seattle’s largest labor council voted to expel the Seattle Police Officers Guild for a failure to 
reckon with institutional racism (Takahama 2020). The California Labor Federation (2020) used 
even stronger language in resolving to disassociate from police and border patrol unions for 
perpetuating “oppression, authoritarianism, and cruelty.” Though the AFL-CIO is still affiliated 
with the International Union of Police Associations, it has faced increased calls from various 
unions around the country to separate (Cunningham-Cook 2020). The Industrial Workers of the 
World (2021), a marginal but historically significant union with broad membership permissions 
and the expressed aim “to build world-wide working-class solidarity,” has long barred law 
enforcement officers from joining. Writer Kristian Williams (2015, 223) finds that police unions 
do not even count as legitimate labor unions because police are “part of the managerial 
machinery of capitalism” and the agendas of their unions “mostly reflect the interests of the 
institution (the police department) rather than those of the working class.” Organizer and reporter 
Kim Kelly (2020) advocates for abolishing police unions entirely “as part of the broader fight to 
defund, demilitarize, and ultimately dismantle the U.S. police force as it currently exists.” 
I build upon this critical angle to form a more comprehensive understanding of how 
police unions contribute to police violence. By examining police unions through a fundamental 
assessment of violent police control, accountability processes and technocratic restructuring 
should no longer be the primary measures of police union harm. Having established policing as 
an institution of violence, police unions should be understood as causing harm primarily by 
strengthening the institution of the police. Drawing from Critical Resistance (2021), an 




violence are most effective when they weaken the institution itself, such as through reducing 
funding, challenging the notion that police create safety, reducing the tools, tactics, and 
technologies that police have at their disposal, and reducing the overall scale of policing. These 
tactics are most effective in reducing police violence because they target the underlying 
mechanics that allow police to operate.  
By recognizing these mechanics as the root of police violence, this analysis can be 
applied to police unions: the violence of police is most notably expanded when police unions 
strengthen the police institution itself by increasing funding, reinforcing the notion that police 
create safety, increasing the tools, tactics, and technologies that police have at their disposal, and 
increasing the overall scale of policing. Though police unions contribute to each of these 
processes through their increased collective bargaining power and political influence, increased 
funding provides a clear example of the institutional fortification of police. This issue is taken up 
in the next section. 
 
VI. The Impact of Police Unions on Police Budgets 
Police budgets have become a primary target for activists seeking to reduce, rather than 
reshape, policing. Police budgets closely reflect the harm of policing because they fund the 
underlying violence of the tools, training, and activity of police officers. Increasing police 
budgets equips a violent institution with more power, leading to increased reliance upon harmful 
solutions to social problems and less money invested into life-affirming systems within 
communities. It is within this context that I assess the impact of police unions on police budgets. 




budgets, I reframe the argument and refine the struggle against police unions within the broader 
context of police disinvestment and the horizon of abolition. 
There is a general public recognition of the association between police unions and police 
budgets, but not much scholarship on the matter. Amidst calls to defund the police over the 
summer of 2020, police union leadership across the U.S. spoke out to oppose police department 
budget cuts. Following police budget cuts in New York City, the Police Benevolent Association 
president claimed the mayor and city council had “surrendered the city to lawlessness” (Pereira 
2015). After police budget cuts in Austin, the Texas Municipal Police Association erected a 
billboard outside the city that read “Warning! Austin Police Defunded Enter at Your Own Risk!” 
(Vera 2020).  
These spectacles have drawn attention to the relationship between police unions and 
police budgets, but the specific impacts of that relationship have not received much scholarly 
attention. A 2008 assessment of police unions found that there has been almost no research on 
the impacts of police unions on city or county finances (Walker 2008). Some have studied the 
association between police unions and salaries, finding that officer starting salaries were 38% 
higher in departments with collective bargaining than in departments without it (Reaves 2011). 
However, salaries alone do not account for the full budgetary impacts of police departments, 
which may include officer health and life insurance, pensions, sick leave, and other benefits, as 
well as police equipment, training, facilities, vehicles, and other various expenditures. 
 
A. Empirical Model 
To estimate the effects of police unions on police budgets, I adapted an empirical model 




regression analysis to determine whether collective bargaining rights led to an increase in police 
violence. Because I am using a continuous data series, I do not use a Poisson method of 
regression analysis, which would require count data. Fixed-effects analysis allows me to measure 
variation within individual jurisdictions that occurs over time while controlling for factors within 
those jurisdictions that are fixed over time. For instance, I can measure the change in the law 
enforcement budget of a given jurisdiction over time while controlling for unique factors of that 
jurisdiction that remain unchanged, such as geographic location. 
My model makes use of the 2003 Florida Supreme Court decision Coastal Florida Police 
Benevolent Association v. Williams (“Williams”), which introduced collective bargaining rights 
for the first time for Florida sheriffs’ deputies. Florida municipal police officers serve as the 
control group in this study because they already had the right to collectively bargain prior to 
2003. The Williams decision acts as a source of exogenous variation, allowing a more precise 
determination of the causal influence of collective bargaining rights on law enforcement budgets 
than other empirical strategies which could have introduced more endogenous variation.  
I empirically explore the impact of bargaining rights, rather than unionization itself for 
two main reasons. First, unionization is more likely to introduce endogenous variation than the 
universal legal conferral of collective bargaining rights. For example, police departments may 
decide to unionize because they have become more politically powerful, which could 
simultaneously affect police budget funding. Second, collective bargaining rights represent the 
ability to collectively leverage power to the members’ advantage, and this creates a “threat” 
effect that may result in increases to police bargaining power in contract negotiations, regardless 
of whether or not a union has been formed. 




𝑌𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒) + 𝛽2(𝑗𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) +  𝛽3(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑗𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑗) + 𝛽4(𝑋𝑗𝑡) + 𝜖𝑗𝑡 
where 𝑌𝑗𝑡 represents either the natural log of inflation-adjusted law enforcement expenditures in 
jurisdiction j and year t (Model 1) or the law enforcement expenditures as a portion of a 
jurisdiction’s total budget in jurisdiction j and year t (Model 2). The coefficient 𝛽0 represents the 
constant term, 𝛽1 represents the time fixed effect (in years), 𝛽2 represents the jurisdiction fixed 
effect, 𝛽3 is the coefficient on the interaction term, where 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is equal to 0 for every year t 
prior to the Williams decision (1997-2002) and 1 for every year t post-Williams. Post-Williams 
includes 2003, the year of the decision, which was made in January of that year. 𝑗𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑗 is 0 if 
jurisdiction j is a municipality and 1 if j is a county, 𝛽4 is a vector of control variables that vary 
over time and/or place, and  𝜖𝑗𝑡 is the residual in jurisdiction j and year t.  
I used the law enforcement expenditures of a jurisdiction as my primary dependent 
variable. Though changes in the amount of money dedicated to law enforcement would indicate 
an expansion or retraction of policing, I also look at changes in the proportion of a jurisdiction’s 
budget dedicated to law enforcement to analyze changes in budget priorities. I hypothesize that 
both police budget proportion and police budgets increase after the introduction of collective 
bargaining rights due to the increased strength of the police as a political and economic actor. I 
control for other factors that influence law enforcement budgets or shares of total budgets, 
including jurisdiction and the remaining control variables. The time variable captures the effect 
of other factors that may have influenced law enforcement budgets not captured by the remaining 
independent variables. 
For control variables, I used population, unemployment rates, Hispanic share of the 
resident population, Black share of the resident population, and arrest rates, all measured at the 




reflects changes in the size of the citizenry, which is hypothesized to positively affect the size of 
law enforcement budgets. Unemployment rate accounts for local economic conditions, serving as 
a proxy for potential criminal behavior, which could cause law enforcement budgets to rise. The 
coefficient on this variable is thus expected to be positive. Arrests indicate the level of law 
enforcement activity in a given jurisdiction. Its coefficient is expected to be positive based on the 
assumption that law enforcement (and, by proxy, criminal) activity serves as reason to increase 
law enforcement spending. The Hispanic and Black shares of the population are meant to 
account for changes in demographic characteristics of a jurisdiction that may lead to increases or 
reductions in police budgets, depending on perceptions of racial threat or familiarity. Their 
coefficients are hypothesized to be positive, indicating that law enforcement spending positively 
correlates with increases in Black and Hispanic shares of the population for the purposes of 
controlling those populations, as discussed in the earlier police analysis. 
 
B. Data 
Initially, I submitted public records requests for budget data from cities and counties 
across Florida. There were several challenges with this method of data collection, as it involved 
sending emails and submitting forms to a significant number of local governments, many of 
which either did not have the requested files or would have required substantial public records 
request fees.  
I then found a centralized database of comprehensive budgets at the Florida Department 
of Financial Services (2021) Local Government Financial Reporting with data on the 58 counties 
and 268 municipalities of interest between 1997 and 2010, the time range of my study. Excluded 




deputies prior to the Williams decision (Broward, Charlotte, Escambia, Flagler, Jacksonville, 
Miami-Dade, Monroe, Nassau, and Volusia) as well as any municipality that did not have budget 
data for at least one year pre- and one year post-Williams or the appropriate control variables in 
the Dharmapala, McAdams, and Rappaport (2019) dataset. After formatting the data and 
compiling them into a single file, I had variables indicating the jurisdiction type 
(municipality/county), the name of the jurisdiction, the year, the total expenditures of that 
jurisdiction year, and the law enforcement expenditures of that jurisdiction year.  
I then generated two alternative dependent variables: 1) the natural log of inflation-
adjusted law enforcement budgets (in chained 2012 dollars) and 2) law enforcement expenditures 
as a share of total expenditures, representing the proportion of a given jurisdiction year’s total 
budget that was dedicated toward law enforcement. Using real dollars more accurately represents 
law enforcement expenditures over time than nominal dollars by deflating budget changes that 
are a result of inflation, rather than spending priorities. The natural log is used to be able to 
interpret the coefficient as a percentage change in law enforcement expenditures. 
Model (1) gives a direct measure of the impacts of collective bargaining on real law 
enforcement expenditures. In Model (2), the law enforcement budget share may vary if either the 
numerator (law enforcement expenditures) or the denominator (total jurisdiction expenditures) 
changes. This will indicate how law enforcement spending changes in comparison to total 
spending but does not isolate the effects of collective bargaining on changes in law enforcement 
expenditures.  
To create the interaction term, my variable of interest in the regressions, I generated the 
post variable which contained 1 for every observation with a year equal to or greater than 2003 




multiplied post by the jurisdiction dummy variable, in which municipalities equal 0 and counties 
(those affected by the Williams decision) equal 1. Thus, my interaction term had a value of 1 for 




Table 2 presents the results of Model (1) for the years 1997-2010 where the dependent 
variable is the natural log of real annual law enforcement expenditures. The regressions were run 
with robust standard errors to account for variation of standard errors across jurisdictions. The 
coefficient on the interaction between a post-Williams dummy and a county dummy is the 
variable of interest. The results indicate that after the Williams decision, sheriffs’ budgets 
increased by 29.5% (at the 99% level), holding all other independent variables constant.  
The natural log of the resident population had a positive coefficient of 0.519 (at 95% 
significance), indicating a positive correlation between changes in population size and changes in 
law enforcement expenditures, as predicted. The Hispanic share of the population had a positive 
coefficient of 3.708 (at 99% significance), indicating a strong positive correlation between the 
Hispanic share of a jurisdiction’s population and change in law enforcement expenditures. The 
Black share of the population had a positive coefficient of 1.849 (at 90% significance), indicating 
a positive correlation between the Black share of a jurisdiction’s population and change in law 
enforcement expenditures. The results of these two demographic control variables are consistent 
with the argument that a higher Hispanic and Black share of the population is perceived as a 
“threat” needing to be controlled, thus driving higher law enforcement expenditures. The natural 




correlation between change in arrests and change in law enforcement expenditures, which is 
consistent with the argument that increased police activity would result in rising police budgets. 
The coefficient of the unemployment rate was positive as hypothesized but not statistically 
significant. 
In Model (2), the dependent variable is law enforcement expenditures as a proportion of 
total jurisdiction budgets. The interaction between a post-Williams dummy and a county dummy 
serves as the variable of interest. The results indicate that after the Williams decision, the 
proportion of sheriffs’ budgets of total jurisdiction expenditures increased by 1.3% (at the 99% 
level), holding all other independent variables constant. This indicates that sheriffs’ budgets 
increased at a greater rate than other budget items (or because overall spending fell).  
The unemployment rate had a positive coefficient of 0.002 (at 99% significance), 
indicating a positive, but small effect of unemployment rate on the law enforcement share of 
total jurisdiction expenditures. This is consistent with the hypothesis that higher unemployment 
rates are consistent with a perception of a greater potential for criminal activity, leading to higher 
spending on law enforcement as a share of total public sector spending. The Hispanic share of 
the population had a negative coefficient of -0.255 (at the 99% significance level), indicating that 
a 1 percent increase in the Hispanic share of the population led to a 0.26 percent decline in 
sheriffs’ budgets as a share of total spending. The negative coefficient is not consistent with a 
hypothesis that a rising Hispanic share of the population elicits a sense of “threat” by members of 
the dominant racial group, leading to higher expenditures.  
It should be noted, however, that the dependent variable may fall due to increases in 
spending on non-police areas so this result should be viewed with some caution. For example, 




demonstrated in the results of Model (1), but spending on other budget items such as 
transportation and communications infrastructure may rise even more.  
The coefficients on arrests and Black share of the population were positive as 
hypothesized but not statistically significant. The coefficient on the natural log of the population 
was negative, which is not consistent with the hypothesis that increased population would lead to 
higher proportions of law enforcement spending, but the coefficient was not statistically 
significant. 
These results support the hypothesis that collective bargaining had a positive significant 
impact on law enforcement departments’ ability to expand their budgets, both independently and 
in relation to their respective jurisdiction’s total budgets. The coefficients on the Hispanic and 
Black shares of the population in Model (1) are also of note. The high positive coefficients 
supports earlier analyses of police as a minority-targeting force by indicating a strong correlation 
between changes in police spending and the Hispanic and Black shares of the population. 
However, the negative coefficient on the Hispanic share of the population in Model (2) defies my 
empirical expectations, suggesting a negative correlation between the Hispanic share of a 
population and the law enforcement proportion of a jurisdiction’s total budget.  
 
D. Limitations of the Empirical Analysis 
A limitation to this analysis is that my control variables accounting for population, racial 
demographics, and unemployment rates were measured at the county-year level rather than the 
jurisdiction-year level. Therefore, municipality characteristics and changes could not be entirely 
accurately captured through county data in which the municipalities resided. Also, 




than the largest cities, and though municipality-level populations were available from census 
data, they were not included in the Dharmapala, McAdams, and Rappaport (2019) dataset. 
Arrests were used as an independent variable in this analysis, but arrests may not be 
exogenous to police budgets. For instance, higher police budgets may have led to more arrests. 
Though they were intended to control for police activity, and thus a potential for budget 
fluctuations, police budgets may not be tied to the actual conditions of crime in a given 
jurisdiction. As highlighted in sections II.B, and III.B., crime rates and stories and often 
manipulated to justify more spending on punishment. Relatedly, arrest rates are self-reported by 
law enforcement agencies. Not only are data collection models frequently antiquated, but police 
agencies can be motivated to deflate or inflate how data are collected and reported to advance 
political interests (Prison Legal News 2013; Asher and Horwitz 2020). Additionally, I am 
missing several arrest observations because the Dharmapala, McAdams, and Rappaport (2019) 
dataset did not contain some of the municipalities in my own dataset. I was unable to access the 
appropriate arrest data from the original source of the borrowed dataset. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 This thesis contextualizes the power of police unions within the staggering scale of police 
violence. Many criticize how police unions shield officers from accountability and block efforts 
to reform policing. Others note how unionization leads to more frequent police killings and 
incidents of violent misconduct. These assessments typically provide a narrow view of how 
police unions facilitate the violence of police. By interpreting the institution of police as 
fundamentally violent, I assess how police unions contribute to violence by expanding policing, 




showed that collective bargaining rights led to a 29.5 percent increase in law enforcement 
expenditures and a 1.3 percent increase in the share of law enforcement expenditures in total 
jurisdiction budgets. 
 Despite legal protection from his police union, former Minneapolis Police officer Derek 
Chauvin was eventually convicted of murdering George Floyd. To some, the permeability of his 
legal defense and the support for his conviction from other police unions may be evidence that 
police unions (and, more generally, police) can be redeemed. A thorough assessment of police 
violence understands, however, that George Floyd’s death was the logical outcome of centuries 
of investment into punitive systems built on anti-Blackness. Though the police union of the New 
York Police Department claims “what Derek Chauvin did that day was not policing. It was 
murder” (Ongweso Jr. 2021), the union fails to recognize it was both. Police unions failed to 
protect Chauvin from conviction, but in doing so, they relegitimized the institution that allowed 
George Floyd to be murdered in the first place. With the guilty verdict, politicians have felt less 
pressure to address the systemic issues of police and Chauvin is treated as an exception to the 
violence of policing (Treene and Goba 2021). As communities continue to address police 
violence at its core by attempting to defund police departments, they will have to consider how 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 





Total expenditure in 2012 dollars 4,473 126,000,000 328,000,000 419,999 3,550,000,000 
Law enforcement expenditure in 
2012 dollars 
4,473 13,700,000 29,800,000 11.500 341,000,000 
Law enforcement budget 
proportion 
4,473 0.168 0.101 0.000002 0.717 
Unemployment rate 4,472 5.570 2.540 2.200 14.700 
Hispanic share of the population 4,472 0.146 0.155 0.010 0.650 
Black share of the population 4,472 0.147 0.083 0.021 0.584 
Population (in thousands) 4,472 653.700 701.700 6.332 2500.600 
Arrests (in thousands)  4,082 0.855 1.762 0 16.116 
Note: Several arrest observations are missing (see section VI.D. Limitations of the Empirical Analysis) 
 
Table 2. Regression Results 

















































Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
